And dlew, if it helps, no one is reading your emails. There's a huge difference between the ominous sounding "intercept" and actual "surveillance".
Imagine if the discovery phase in a case worked slightly different, and instead of requesting documents, you had access to a huge repository of potentially relevant data. But if you used your subpoena to access a document you weren't sure was discoverable and hadn't been vetted, you were thrown off the case, suspended without pay and faced possible termination and criminal charges (even if you discovered an unrelated crime and even if that crime was serious).
No one is haphazardly rooting through your stuff.
Yeah but that's not how discovery works and there's a reason for that and I think the reason is more than "we've never had the capacity to create a repository of potentially relevant data."
I understand that no one is reading through my email, but it's still troubling, right?
I'd be interested in hearing your take on whether or not this poses some 4th amendment problem and if so, to what degree?
My legal background consists of a year as a paralegal in business litigation, so I honestly don't feel qualified to say anything too intelligent on it (as my clumsy discovery analogy suggests).
The problem with the discovery analogy is that, in this case, the "other side" would never willingly hand over documents and would likely destroy existing evidence and adjust their communications to avoid creating new evidence if they were made aware of an inquiry.
And again, despite what Snowden says about being able to wiretap the president with a few clicks from his desk in Hawaii, the process doesn't work that way. Every person with access to or even tangential involvement in the system has to pass several tests each year displaying knowledge of the legal restrictions on accessing such information (and the ramifications of doing so incorrectly or irresponsibly). Requests go through layers of approval and authorization and constant oversight from people whose job (and primary incentive) is to detect errant use and discipline those responsible.
So, I guess my take is that the information is already out there. This system makes the info accessible to the relevant authorities but only after probable cause (and a "foreign factor") are established.
I'd be interested how people with your background view that regarding the fourth amendment. FWIW, in my experience our legal department has been very cautious in these sorts of issues (for instance, government agencies or their contractors absolutely cannot run analytics on social media site users, even for the ostensibly benign purpose of measuring the effectiveness of the engagement efforts of our embassies with foreign audiences).
But again, I am by no means an "insider". Maybe it's as Orwellian as kstatefreak and dax think it is. I'm just going by what little non-classified knowledge I have of the program coupled with what I think is an obvious analysis of the irrational statements made so far from Snowden himself, who doesn't strike me as a particularly reliable source. Of course, perhaps I'm casting Snowden as a Benjy Compson while ignoring my own role as Jason.
